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Abstract: This article seeks to intervene in the ‘television aesthetics’ versus ‘media and 
cultural studies’ debate. It argues that aesthetic evaluation does not necessarily rely upon bad 
textual others or result in canon construction. It engages with Bourdieu in order to 
demonstrate that his account of cultural capital and distinction is more nuanced than is 
suggested by its uptake by scholars who want to use it to argue against evaluative activity. 
Finally, it argues that television aesthetics cannot be divorced from ‘media and cultural 10 
studies’ to the extent that some of its practitioners appear to want.  
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Because those who take part in a game agree on the stakes, at least sufficiently to fight 
for them, one may choose to emphasize either the complicities which unite them in 
hostility or the hostilities which separate them in complicity. (Bourdieu 1984: 315) 
 
When advocates of television aesthetics seek to describe the nature of their approach, 
they will often distinguish it from other approaches to the study of television that form part of 20 
‘media and cultural studies’.  For example, Sarah Cardwell emphasises that her broad 
preliminary definition of television aesthetics makes ‘deliberate use of vocabulary drawn 
from philosophical aesthetics, rather than media or cultural studies’ (2006: 73).  In the 
opening pages of the introduction to the anthology Television Aesthetics and Style, editors 
Jason Jacobs and Steven Peacock contrast the approach that they are recommending for 
attention with other approaches which possess a ‘lack of attention to style’, in which ‘theory 
is mapped onto the television “text” to decipher its so-called coded meanings’, and which 
favour ‘contextual readings’ and ‘socio-cultural readings’ rather than ‘focus[ing] in on the 
text itself’ (2013: 1-3).  It does not seem an imposition to gather all of these features under 
the heading of the disciplinary territory mentioned in direct connection to the ‘lack of 30 
attention to style’ on the introduction’s first page: ‘Media and Cultural Studies’ (ibid: 1).  
This differentiating impulseof those working within television aesthetics, a routine 
manoeuvre of a new mode of enquiry within a discipline or field,  becomes even more 
understandable when one notes that certain television scholars more aligned (than television 
aestheticians) with the traditions of media and cultural studies effectively argue that their 
disciplines’ insights pre-emptively forbid or negate the activities that television aestheticians 
undertake.  Cardwell seems to me entirely correct when she suggests that to date: 
 
the wariest responses to this nascent field [television aesthetics] come from 
within television studies itself – especially from those scholars working 40 
comfortably within the traditions of media and cultural studies. [...] In a subject 
area that, generally speaking, exhibits an easy-going, all-embracing pluralism, 
television aesthetics triggers exceptionally strong objections from its dissenters. 
(2013: 24) 
 
Recent examples of these strong objections can be found in Matt Hills’s article 
‘Television Aesthetics: A Pre-structuralist Danger’ (2011) and Michael Z. Newman and 
Elana Levine’s monograph Legitimating Television: Media Convergence and Cultural Status 
(2012). On the first page of the former, Hills argues that the ‘pre-structuralist’ strand of 
television aesthetics that he identifies ‘not only neglect[s] issues of cultural power linked to 50 
canon-building, but in fact wilfully dematerialise[s] what amount to symbolic relations of 
inequality embedded in canonicity’ (2011: 99). In the chapter of the latter which critically 
explores the ‘legitimation’ of television within academic television studies, Newman and 
Levine acknowledge that ‘[i]t is understandable that scholars might engage in comparative 
analyses of TV aesthetics’, but immediately add a sharp warning: ‘Yet, in so doing, we 
should remember that, as Henry Jenkins has written, “Aesthetics is a discourse of power, 
claimed as the exclusive property of dominant classes as a club to use against the ‘debased’ 
tastes and preferences of the lower orders”’ (2012: 166). Such objections are not new. They 
are what Charlotte Brunsdon is reacting to in her exhortation in the seminal ‘Problems with 
quality’ that ‘We do not defeat the social power which presents certain critical judgements as 60 
natural and inevitable by refusing to make critical judgements’ (1990: 73). Their persistence 
(and, some would add, the insistence with which they are presented) is what lies behind Jason 
Jacobs’s rather testy response to Hills: ‘nobody has to pay any attention to canons’ (2006: 27) 
(which Hills’s subsequent reference to wilful dematerialisations of symbolic power quoted 
above is a response to in turn). 
Scholars informed by the disciplines of media and cultural studies, including Hills and 
Newman and Levine, seek to demonstrate that aesthetic analyses of television always (and 
perhaps also only) constitute displaced demonstrations of the cultural capital and distinction 
of their authors and the class fractions to which they belong, and are therefore not the 
defensible species of discourse those authors think they are, and are moreover a departure 70 
from the political and social progressiveness of other work within television studies that 
demands moral censure.  Television aestheticians, on the other hand, often eschew the 
vocabulary, approaches and areas of attention of media and cultural studies –which tend to 
emphasise first and foremost the social dimensions of the production and (especially) the 
reception of media texts – and lay claim to precision, delicacy, and attention to textual 
construction and detail as correctives to the blunt instruments, pigeonholing and blind spots 
they see in their opponents. When these divisions and hostilities are at their sharpest, it can 
seem that for adherents of media and cultural studies, the all-pervasiveness of the social 
leaves no room for the aesthetic (other than as a disguised product of relationships of social 
power), whilst the polemics of television aesthetics, reacting against and seeking to correct 80 
this perspective, focus on the aesthetic in a way that screens out the social. 
The issues and debates surrounding the relationship between television aesthetics, the 
practice of evaluation, and what I will provisionally term ‘the realm of the social’ are what I 
seek to explore in this article. In such territory, the formidable intellectual work of Pierre 
Bourdieu looms especially large and cannot be ignored, but what I hope to demonstrate is that 
this work should not be allowed, as it so often is, to act as an intellectual roadblock. My 
discussion is structured around three questions: 1. Does aesthetic evaluation necessarily rely 
upon bad textual others and does it necessarily result in canon construction? 2. Are there 
other ways in which aesthetic evaluation might perpetuate or be complicit with social 
inequality? 3. Can television aesthetics be divorced from media and cultural studies to the 90 
degree that some of the practitioners of the former sometimes appear to want?  I am not 
straightforwardly aligned with one side of this debate or the other, as shall become clear, and 
at the end of my survey of the terrain as it currently exists, I offer some recommendations 
about how television aesthetics might proceed. 
 
Does aesthetic evaluation necessarily rely upon bad textual others and does it 
necessarily result in canon construction? 
 
In the (to date) four articles that comprise the exchange between Matt Hills and Jason Jacobs 
(Jacobs 2001; Hills 2005; Jacobs 2006; Hills 2011), one passage around which disagreement 100 
has unfolded is the following, from Jacobs’s initial article: 
 
Clearly, it is not appropriate to apply criteria of authenticity, creativity and innovation 
in the same way to Who Wants to be a Millionaire? (ITV, 1998-) and ER (NBC, 1994-).  
The terms of judgment will vary according to what is under consideration: we will not 
consider a game show or a news programme in the same way as a serial drama even if 
they share, on the face of it, dramatic force, narrative dynamics and creativity. (2001: 
430) 
 
I will not rehearse in its entirety the debate that this passage has given rise to, but will instead 110 
begin by jumping forwards to Jacobs’s assertion, which forms part of the debate, that 
‘Criticism that wishes to understand and account for excellence does not require a bad 
“other”’ (2006: 30).  Hills, responding to this assertion, claims that: 
 
for [Jacobs’s] position to make sense [...] he requires that ‘excellence’ (that is an 
identification of genre-specific ‘goodness’ or sub-generic ‘fitness for purpose’ or 
‘innovation’ or ‘creativity’) be identifiable without criteria!  […] Jacobs […] seems 
[…] to want to wish away structuralism and its focus on meaning as relational rather 
than transcendent and therefore in the text itself. 
For, of course, if excellence was based on any criteria whatsoever, then its 120 
recognition and identification could emerge only through a series of binaries, being set 
against ‘bad’ Others such as ‘ordinary’ TV (Bonner 2003), ‘non-innovative’ TV, 
‘unremarkable’ TV and so on.  And this would remain the case even if we followed 
Jacobs’s helpful reminder that ‘TV’ is too big a category, and that specific genres and 
types of texts might be a better mid-range option for analysis. (2011: 112) 
 
It is not clear to me that either of Jacobs’s statements above commit him to the notion that 
evaluation can proceed without criteria (although it ought to be mentioned that elsewhere in 
his argument Jacobs does register disagreement with Geraghty’s suggestion [2003: 32] that it 
would be desirable and possible to develop a ‘clear evaluative method’ for television 130 
criticism, because he believes that ‘criticism should evolve from our engagement with … 
texts’ and that we should not ‘theoris[e] ahead of experience’ [2006: 24]).  Rather, his point is 
that ‘to compare different types of television according to the same aesthetic criteria would be 
inappropriate – not because of any question of value, but because it would do enormous 
damage to the achievements of game shows or news programmes or serial dramas to treat 
them as if they were the same thing’ (2006: 30). This statement echoes Brunsdon’s point that 
‘the generic diversity of television must be taken into account in discussions of quality’ 
(1990: 77). (The rest of Brunsdon’s sentence can be read as an anticipation of Hills’s claim 
that ascriptions of excellence denigrate other types of television: ‘…but not in ways which 
makes quality “genre specific”, creating certain “sink” or “trash” genres of which demands 140 
are not made’ [ibid].) It also echoes Geraghty’s suggestion that, because of the ‘extraordinary 
range of programmes on television’ (2003: 29), aesthetic judgments about television ought to 
proceed ‘within categories’ (ibid: 32) so that (and here Geraghty echoes Jacobs) ‘the criteria 
used for drama are not the same as those for quiz shows or sport’ (ibid). 
It is true that proposing criteria for judgment gives rise to a framework within which 
more and less successful instances of the same type of object or practice can be identified – 
but the ‘bad’, or ‘less good’, objects would not be bad others so much as bad or less good 
instances of the same thing.  As Mittell (2013: 47) argues, ‘we must think beyond a reductive 
binary logic that insists that value is a zero-sum game where lauding any single criterion 
inherently derides its opposite.’ For Hills, it seems, ‘ordinary’, ‘non-innovative’ and/or 150 
‘unremarkable’ television must exist as entities, real or imagined, against which television 
valued for being extraordinary, innovative and/or remarkable must, even if only implicitly, be 
being valued.  But again: a charge of a lack of innovation, for example, only really sticks, and 
matters, if what is discerned is a failure of innovation – something an object has striven for, 
or, as an instance of a particular kind of thing, ought to have striven for, but not achieved – as 
opposed to its mere absence.  Jacobs’s invocation of news programming is instructive here: 
innovation is by no means necessarily unwelcome in the genre, but its presence is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for us to evaluate a token of that type positively; other qualities 
matter more.  Likewise, ‘ordinary television’ can function as a descriptive term (as it 
predominantly does in the account of Bonner, 2003) rather than an evaluative one, and as 160 
with the related category of ‘lifestyle’ television, there can exist (as Brunsdon, 2004 has 
persuasively argued) better and worse instances of its programmes, but we will not 
necessarily get at these evaluative differences using the vocabulary or criteria of ordinariness 
versus extra-ordinariness or innovation versus familiarity or reliability, and we will certainly 
not get at them by adding a consideration of a completely different genre to the equation. 
A further point of debate between Hills and Jacobs concerns the status and functioning 
of canons.  Hills attributes to Jacobs (at one remove: via Matthew Arnold and F R Leavis, 
with whom he aligns Jacobs) the position that ‘canons are good, canons are “real”’ (Hills 
2011: 110).  However, whilst Jacobs offers a critique of the editorial abstention in the 
anthology Fifty Key Television Programmes (Creeber 2004) from offering ‘artistic or creative 170 
excellence as a criterion [of selection]’ (Jacobs 2006: 27), one does not find, here or 
elsewhere in Jacobs’s writing, a sustained defence of canons as a way of organising television 
studies curricula or research agendas.  What one certainly does find is sustained 
argumentation in favour of granting the activity of aesthetic evaluation a more significant 
place in television studies than it currently possesses.  In trying to drive a wedge between the 
activities of judgment and evaluation on the one hand and the potential outcome of an agreed-
upon group of excellent television programmes on the other, it is useful to first turn briefly to 
Mittell’s work. 
After presenting a comparative evaluative analysis in which he celebrates the 
contrasting qualities and achievements of Breaking Bad (AMC, 2008-13) and The Wire 180 
(HBO, 2002-8), Mittell suggests: 
 
Making an evaluative claim is not necessarily designed to construct a canon to exclude 
other possibilities, but rather to posit a contingent perspective on why something 
matters, both to me and presumably to other viewers who similarly embrace it.  It is 
neither a statement of fact nor a proof, but an invitation to dialogue and debate. (2013: 
55) 
 
Mittell’s work is driven and shaped explicitly by his high regard for most of the programmes 
he discusses at length in his account of ‘complex TV.’  I mention this as a way of introducing 190 
a further reason why, for Mittell and others like him who seek to articulate the qualities and 
achievements of television programmes they value, the desired result is not the inscription of 
those programmes’ names on a list ratifying their pre-eminence in such a way that all that 
remains is for everyone to assent to the completed act of judgment and its validity, having 
been saved the bother of considering and experiencing the programmes for themselves.  The 
desired result is, rather, that the critical attention and evaluative claims offered will aid others 
in their own critical analyses and evaluative judgments, thus potentially deepening these 
engagements (the fact that such critical accounts are amenable to being used as a way of 
sharpening counterarguments which advance a negative evaluation of the same text would no 
doubt be welcomed by Mittell and others).  This attention to textual detail, which 200 
characterises the best acts of evaluative criticism, can also be used to reflect upon why the 
activities of criticism on the one hand and the warnings that aesthetic evaluation is always 
and necessarily an expression of taste determined by social status and/or that judgments about 
meaning or value are hopelessly contingent on the other often seem to fail to meet. 
In his book The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction, as a way of challenging the 
tendency of those sceptical of the viability of evaluative criticism to ‘cover too much ground 
too simply’ (Booth 1988: 101), Wayne C. Booth offers a brief experiment, based upon an 
often-repeated class exercise of his.  He presents W. B. Yeats’s poem After Long Silence 
alongside various alternative versions of it – some written by Booth for illustrative purposes, 
others earlier drafts by Yeats himself – and invites appraisals of the relative success and value 210 
of the different versions.  For example, Booth first replaces the poem’s first two lines 
(‘Speech after long silence; it is right,/All other lovers being estranged or dead’) with ‘Speech 
after long silence; it is appropriate,/All other lovers being estranged or passed to the other 
side’.  In the face of unanimous agreement that the poem as it stands is superior to the 
suggested changes, Booth reflects upon the implications of this: 
 
By changing our questions from ‘Is this poem absolutely good (or good for us)?’ and 
‘Is evaluation objective?’ to ‘Are these lines better than those, in this poem?’ we have 
found an astonishing consensus on a value judgment about a literary question – 
astonishing, that is, if all value judgments are merely ‘personal’ or ‘subjective.’ (Booth 220 
1988: 103, original italics) 
 
We are in part here retreading the ground we covered earlier when considering Jacobs’s 
suggestion that ‘Criticism that wishes to understand and account for excellence does not 
require a bad “other”’ (2006: 30).  The only bad ‘others’ in Booth’s experiment are 
alternative versions of the same poem.  It is possible to do a great deal of critical and 
evaluative work by assessing the poem’s construction, and the quality of the relationships that 
it creates between its parts.  This type of evaluative procedure possesses its literary studies 
locus classicus within the school of ‘New Criticism’; within the fields of film and television 
studies it has also informed the work of, for example, what we might call the Movie tradition 230 
of mise-en-scène criticism, as well as the very different formalist poetics of David Bordwell, 
upon which Mittell draws extensively in his analysis of complex TV in general and the 
‘intrinsic norms’ of particular programmes.  The kinds of accounts that the fledgling sub-field 
of television aesthetics has thus far offered are often characterised by this kind of parsing of 
‘internal construction’ or ‘intrinsic norms’; surely such an approach eludes the necessity of 
evaluation based on aesthetic binaries, which are always also social binaries, and thus avoids 
being implicated in the troubling idea that the ‘deepest function of taste distinction is to 
reproduce the dominant social structure, to perpetuate unequal divisions by class and other 
social groupings’ (Newman and Levine 2012: 6)? 
 240 
Are there other ways in which aesthetic evaluation might perpetuate or be complicit 
with social inequality? 
 
When one confronts this question, the primary source that demands to be engaged with is 
Pierre Bourdieu’s monumental Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste 
(Bourdieu 1984).  Hills cites Bourdieu and Distinction during his debate with Jacobs (Hills 
2011: 110-2).  Newman and Levine use as an epigraph to the opening chapter of their 
Legitimating Television Bourdieu’s pithy aphorism (in translation) ‘Taste classifies, and it 
classifies the classifier’ (2012: 1).  During the course of his hailing of the category of 
‘invisible television’, Brett Mills uses a quote which is from another of Bourdieu’s works, but 250 
would not be out of place in Distinction: ‘Pierre Bourdieu empirically demonstrated how “art 
and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or not, to fulfil a 
function of legitimating social differences”’ (Mills 2010: 11). 
Within television studies, it has been argued in a range of ways that evaluation is not 
(or at least, need not be) disempowering of others, or socially prejudicial. One idea that recurs 
with slight variations is the idea that the process of making judgments is liberating and/or 
emancipatory (the first word pointing the direction of the more liberal inflection of the 
argument, and the second in the more socialist one). This is what Brunsdon (1990: 87) detects 
in Raymond Williams’s writing on television (‘There is here no fear that to exercise 
judgement, to make discriminations, is elitist. Engaging critically with presentations, issues 260 
and stories is seen as emancipator.’) and is a thread one can detect in Brunsdon’s own work. 
Cardwell (2006: 75) has written that ‘television aesthetics opens up to the television audience 
valuable skills of discrimination and evaluation that are ultimately empowering. To avoid 
critical judgement, to deny it to our students, is to deny them an essential critical education’. 
The same line of thought underpins Jacobs’s invocation of Frank Furedi and the notion of 
‘anti-elitist elitism’ towards the end of his response to Hills when he argues that ‘The flattery 
of the ordinary, while it purports to be ever so democratic and inclusive is actually 
patronising and reactionary: it rests on the assumption that the audience is incapable of 
change, cultivation or enlightenment’ (2006: 31). Thinking about how these acts of evaluative 
criticism might generate or feed (other) activities, Brunsdon (1990: 67) argues that there is a 270 
pressing political need for academics to commit themselves to such evaluations and to 
intervene, to avoid a situation in which ‘only the most conservative ideas about quality are 
circulating, and will therefore win the day’; and Geraghty (2003: 41) argues that ‘[o]ur 
students are future makers … of television’. Robin Nelson (1997: 209-34), adopting a 
different approach, tries to excavate a core of ‘common [human] meaningfulness’ (ibid: 228) 
from the individualistic, relativistic and nihilistic impulses of contemporary Western society 
and thought, and uses this as a basis for a model for evaluating television output which 
‘embraces diversity without sacrificing a sense of community. Ideally it would encourage 
both sympathy with and respect for others, and contribute to the restoration of a mutuality 
based in our common being in the world’ (ibid: 232). The lines of argument offered above are 280 
vital contributions to the debate within television studies concerning the interrelation of the 
aesthetic and the social, but because their engagements with Bourdieu’s work are brief at 
best, thinkers committed to Bourdieu’s position regarding this interrelation may require a 
more thorough engagement with that work before considering it worthwhile to revisit their 
commitments and position. 
In fact, it is not only those who do not embrace his position that do not engage closely 
on the page with Bourdieu: whatever the depth of their off-the-page engagements with him, 
in the sources cited above, Hills, Mills and Newman and Levine invoke Bourdieu rather than 
meaningfully engaging with him.  The result is that one might well be left with the sense that 
Bourdieu’s account of ‘distinction’ is more static and binary than it is: there are those with 290 
high degrees of cultural capital (in this case, television scholars) who, through exercising 
their taste, oppress those without it (in this case, other kinds of television viewer).  
Bourdieu’s account certainly relies upon the structuralist credo that there exist binaries that 
shape perception and become ranked pairs awaiting deployment, consciously or 
unconsciously, in social hierarchies and related acts of distinction; however, and thankfully, 
his account of the class fractions he surveys is much more dynamic and fine-grained, and in 
frequent methodological asides, he is at pains to distance his account from any ‘one-
dimensional image of social space’ (ibid: 119).  Bourdieu does not present the agents and 
structures he examines as eternally fixed, but rather pays attention (especially in the first 
chapter of the book’s second part) to the dynamic positions and trajectories of individuals and 300 
class fractions over time.  Within an overall picture of class habituses as coherent sets of 
dispositions and preferences, Bourdieu acknowledges complexities and partial exceptions – 
noting that, for example, ‘at equivalent levels of educational capital, the weight of social 
origin in the practice- and preference-explaining system increases as one moves away from 
the most legitimate areas of culture’ (ibid: 5). One is more likely to acquire a taste for 
Strindberg than to lose a taste for fish and chips. (The question of where along the spectrum 
from cultural illegitimacy to legitimacy television lies is an interesting one. Newman and 
Levine’s account is dedicated to exploring and revealing the ways in which television is 
currently undergoing a process of ‘legitimation’, and although, as may now be becoming 
clear, I disagree with several of their assumptions and conclusions, I find this central element 310 
of their argument convincing.) The aspects of Bourdieu’s account that I want to focus on 
principally here are the multiple roles he presents education as playing in social distinction 
and reproduction, and the subdivisions he pursues between the fractions of what he terms ‘the 
dominant class’. 
Bourdieu distinguishes between ‘cultural inheritance’ and ‘educational capital’ (ibid: 
84, for example) – that is, between the acquisition of culture outside and inside of formal 
education, respectively – and explores how the possession of different permutations of these 
two assets might affect a person’s ability to negotiate social space and appropriate ‘legitimate 
culture’: 
 320 
The Parisian or even provincial primary teacher, who can beat the small employer, the 
provincial doctor or the Parisian antique-dealer in the tests of pure knowledge, is likely 
to appear incomparably inferior to them in all the situations which demand self-
assurance or flair, or even the bluff which can cover lacunae, rather than the prudence, 
discretion and awareness of limits that are associated with scholastic acquisition.  One 
can confuse Bernard Buffet with Jean Dubuffet and yet be quite capable of hiding one’s 
ignorance under the commonplaces of celebration or the knowing silence of a pout, a 
nod or an inspired pose. (84) 
 
Bourdieu puts it most succinctly when he suggests that in order to inhabit the highest levels 330 
of cultural distinction ‘the important thing is to know without ever having learnt’ (ibid: 330).  
There is much – legitimate – fuel here for those who would want to point to the 
baseless snobbery and pretense that often occur within social interaction and the distinctions 
that are enacted there. Within the realm of higher education, it would be difficult, I think, to 
dispute the idea that some students benefit from their cultural inheritance in the seminar 
room, and perhaps even on the assessment page – from, to borrow Bourdieu’s terms, the self-
assurance, flair, bluffing and commonplaces of celebration that form part of a particular class 
habitus. However, and thankfully, that is not all there is to it.  In Bourdieu’s account, the core 
of the habitus of educators and intellectuals – that is, categories into which we would 
probably wish to put those who teach and research television studies within higher education 340 
– is not the posturing and snobbery of the kind indicated above, but a deeper disposition of a 
different sort. 
Bourdieu asserts that ‘the dominant aesthetic – of which the work of art and the 
aesthetic disposition are the most complete embodiments – proposes the combination of ease 
and asceticism, i.e., self-imposed austerity, restraint, reserve, which are affirmed in that 
absolute manifestation of excellence, relaxation in tension’ (1984: 172, italics added).  
Bourdieu begins by contrasting this with ‘the dominated condition’ (and therefore, we might 
say, with Bourdieu, the dominated aesthetic) of the dominated class, ‘characterized, from the 
point of view of the dominant, by the combination of forced poverty and unjustified laxity’ 
(ibid).  However, he also takes care to distinguish between the fractions of the ‘dominant 350 
class’: 
 Whereas the dominant fractions of the dominant class (the ‘bourgeoisie’) demand of art 
a high degree of denial of the social world and incline towards a hedonistic aesthetic of 
ease and facility, symbolized by boulevard theatre or Impressionist painting, the 
dominated fractions (the ‘intellectuals’ and ‘artists’) have affinities with the ascetic 
aspect of aesthetics and are inclined to support all artistic revolutions conducted in the 
name of purity and purification, refusal of ostentation and the bourgeois taste for 
ornament; and the dispositions towards the social world which they owe to their status 
as poor relations incline them to welcome a pessimistic representation of the social 360 
world. (Ibid, italics added) 
 
What Bourdieu refers to at times as the aesthetic disposition is, essentially, the Kantian 
view of the aesthetic; and Distinction, as its full title acknowledges, is implicitly in dialogue 
with Kant and his Critique of Judgment from start to finish.  However, Bourdieu postpones 
until his postscript a ‘direct confrontation’ (488) with Kant.  In one crucial passage of this 
postscript, Bourdieu observes: 
 
Pure pleasure – ascetic, empty pleasure which implies the renunciation of 
pleasure, pleasure purified of pleasure – is predisposed to become a symbol of 370 
moral excellence, and the work of art a test of ethical superiority, an indisputable 
measure of the capacity for sublimation which defines the truly human man. 
[Endnote omitted.] What is at stake in aesthetic discourse, and in the attempted 
imposition of a definition of the genuinely human, is nothing less than the 
monopoly of humanity. (493, original italics) 
 
This is indeed troubling.  In his article on ‘invisible television’, one of Mills’s answers to his 
question ‘Why Does It Matter if Some Television is Invisible?’ (10) is presented under the 
heading ‘Rejecting the Mass’ (12), and in that subsection he cites John Carey’s The 
Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice Among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1800-380 
1939 (1992), and that book’s account of how ‘intellectuals actively engaged in “denying that 
the masses were real people”’ (Mills 2010: 12).  Kant’s false universalisation, Bourdieu 
argues, constitutes a failure to recognise the socio-economic underpinnings of the aesthetic he 
presents and endorses (Bourdieu 1984: 495). 
Even if we are wary – as we certainly should be – of equating ease and asceticism with 
the supremely human, and therefore, implicitly or explicitly, dehumanising those who do not 
enjoy such dispositions, it remains worth considering what such dispositions might have to 
recommend them.   ‘Ease is so universally approved’, Bourdieu convincingly suggests, 
‘because it represents the most visible assertion of freedom from the constraints which 
dominate ordinary people’ (ibid: 252).  Asceticism, as we have seen, is less universal, and 390 
Bourdieu’s incisive turns of phrase do a good job of pinpointing the smallness and 
narrowness that are part of such a habitus: ‘With his petty cares and petty needs, the petit 
bourgeois is indeed a bourgeois “writ small”. [...] [S]trict and sober, discreet and severe, in 
his dress, his speech, his gestures and his whole bearing, he always lacks something in 
stature, breadth, substance, largesse’ (339).  Opposed on the one side to the expansiveness of 
the bourgeoisie, the asceticism of the dominated fraction of the dominant class is similarly 
distinct from what Richard Hoggart called ‘the full rich life’ (1957: 132-66) of working class 
culture (Bourdieu’s dominated class; although they are a smaller part of his book than 
Hoggart’s, and although they are observed from what is palpably a greater distance, 
Distinction’s discussions of working-class habituses and lifestyles sometimes sound 400 
strikingly similar to Hoggart’s).  Certainly, the disposition towards and sources of pleasure of 
the dominated fractions of the dominant class constitute a libidinal economy that entails a 
high degree of repression, and is therefore susceptible to Freudian laughter.  However, whilst 
these sources of and routes to pleasure can be seen to be a contingent product of a set of 
socio-economic conditions, this does not make them arbitrary (any more or less so than the 
other habituses to which they stand in contrast) or unreal.   
Many features of the Kantian aesthetic are hard to separate from the features of 
education, perhaps especially higher education.  This, perhaps, is the level at which 
Bourdieu’s argument about the deeply determinant nature of habitus is difficult to avoid 
entirely or in good conscience.  It is not as simple as television scholars choosing television 410 
programmes whose representations flatter or replicate their worldviews or social fraction.  
What is much harder to avoid is the fact that the discourse of higher education, almost by its 
very nature, demands that its participants embrace norms of distancing and debating that 
impose a rather Kantian way of seeing (ways of seeing which certain kinds of television 
programmes will reward more deeply and thoroughly than others – a conclusion which will 
be unattractive to many television scholars, but which Cardwell [2013] has begun to do the 
work of acknowledging and defending).  We are in Foucauldian territory here, arguing that 
the normalizing forces of higher education do not allow all possible things that might be said 
about the objects it studies to be said.  It is hard to think of a way out of this situation, given 
that these same norms are the ones that underpin the social world of democracy in general: 420 
the ability of individuals to meet and exchange ideas in a manner aimed to promote the 
speaking rights and the safety of all parties. 
  A feature of Kantian ethics is the idea that an action or quality can only be truly good 
if one is able to argue that it is desirable that everyone perform that action or possess that 
quality (this is a paraphrase of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law).  Clearly, this returns us to 
the dangerous territory of universalism (and its shadowy accompaniment, dehumanisation).  
However, we might also note, in this context, that it is the opposite of ‘distinction’!  
Intellectuals and, especially, educators do not (or perhaps we should say not only) jealously 
guard the culture they have inherited and the ways of seeing they have acquired; they (also) 
seek to pass it on to others – and not just others like themselves.  (Bourdieu would argue that 430 
this still constitutes a way of perpetuating definitions of and ways of approaching ‘legitimate’ 
culture, to the benefit of those doing the perpetuating, and their descendents – and that in the 
very act of performing the ‘passing on’, they shape social subjects like themselves. It is hard 
to refute such an argument, but one might reasonably suggest that it is not the whole story.)  
One word for this is ‘cultivation’, a word that Jacobs pauses upon towards the end of the 
latest article of his in his debate with Hills: ‘The sense of cultivating the public imagination – 
not imposing, not leading – but cultivating seems to me to be central to what it is to be a 
scholar and an academic’ (2006: 31).  I shall return to the matter of ‘cultivation’ in the 
conclusion, after I have addressed the last of the three questions posed at the beginning of this 
article. 440 
 
Can television aesthetics be divorced from media and cultural studies to the degree that 
some of its practitioners sometimes appear to want? 
 
In this section I would like to apply a little critical pressure to a particular passage of criticism 
during which two prominent scholars advance certain claims regarding how television 
aesthetics stands in relation to media and cultural studies. My aim is to explore the 
relationship between the approaches and assumptions of these two ostensibly opposed areas, 
before making (at the end of this section and in the conclusion) my own suggestions about 
how the relationship might best (that is, most accurately and most advantageously) be 450 
conceived. 
Jacobs and Peacock, in the introduction to their anthology Television Aesthetics and 
Style, after praising the ‘critical comportment’ of certain of the anthology’s contributors and 
favourably contrasting such comportment with ‘the overconfidence of television and cultural 
studies in the certainty that often accompanies its translation of the content of television into 
neatly defined socio-cultural objects’, offer a discussion of a moment from Mad Men 
(implicitly, as a brief example of this comportment), taken from the fifth season episode 
‘Mystery Date’.  I will quote the discussion in its entirety: 
 
Joan [...] tells her husband Greg, an army surgeon who is voluntarily returning to 460 
Vietnam, to leave.  ‘If I walk out that door, that’s it’, he shouts at her; ‘That’s it’, she 
replies, effectively ending their marriage.  After he slams the door, her mother (who has 
been living with her and helping with their baby) comes back into the kitchen holding a 
coffee pot; ‘It’s over’, Joan tells her.  The pot is put down: she discards it in one 
motion, and sits in silence with her daughter, as if in that instance it becomes a quaint 
irrelevance, once an emblem of servitude now just a raw, gross object.  That gesture, 
the holding with two hands – one on the handle the other protected by a cloth under it, 
taking its weight in two ways before abandoning it, is marvellous, eloquent.  But it is 
difficult to translate such eloquence into words, hard to be expressive in the face of 
such expressivity; indeed we might feel haunted by the sheer apparent obviousness of 470 
what it must be, had we the words to express it.  Of course, we might want to say, in 
that gesture in this arrangement of objects there is something to be said about the 
domestic labour of women in history, at this time, something that demands a feminist 
response, or some version or variation of that.  But in its discoursing on our recent 
history, one that seems only an eye-blink from the present, yet sufficiently distant to 
allow us to be distant too, Mad Men is both a temptation to and a warning against this 
kind of critical hubris.  It is doubtful that wanting to tie feminist thinking to this 
moment could sufficiently capture its expressive punctum.  Not at least, until there had 
been the time – for the show and for us – to allow it to settle into the sedimented 
geology of the cultural imagination. (2013: 13, original italics) 480 
 
Before commenting on this passage, I want to make it clear that I do not view it as 
representative or symptomatic of Jacobs and Peacock’s introduction as a whole.  
Nevertheless, it is part of their account, and the part where the proposed divorce of television 
aesthetics and cultural studies is pushed to its furthest extreme – one which I find untenable.  
It is not clear to me why ‘it is doubtful that wanting to tie feminist thinking to this 
moment could sufficiently capture its expressive punctum’, or why a feminist response to this 
moment would necessarily constitute an act of critical hubris.  In fact, by describing the 
coffee pot as an ‘emblem of servitude’, have Jacobs and Peacock not already drawn 
implicitly upon feminist thinking?  The lassitude and vagueness of the sentence that begins 490 
‘Of course, we might want to say...’ fits the writers’ rhetorical purposes in wanting to 
position feminism as a way of seeing that lacks the fine-grainedness to capture expressive 
punctums, but it is hardly an adequate picture of feminism’s possibilities.  Jacobs and 
Peacock are making a point of calling attention to a moment which they think would be 
screened out by an approach in search of ‘neatly defined socio-cultural objects’ such as 
oppressed housewives.  They are probably right about this but what is at stake is not a 
distinction between aesthetics and feminism.  One might go even further, and observe that the 
focus on, and the attempt to reclaim, the texture of lived experience (eschewing large, 
abstract categories), and on the difficulty of finding the words to capture and account for it, 
echoes these words – ‘As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover 500 
material, ate peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts and 
Brownies, lay beside her husband at night, she [each American suburban housewife] was 
afraid to ask even of herself the silent question: “Is this all?”’ – taken from the first chapter 
(entitled ‘The Problem that Has No Name’) of a significant Mad Men intertext: the seminal 
text of second wave feminism, Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963: 13). 
Surely what is at stake is not what is discussed but how it is discussed: it is a question 
of priorities and purposes, not of making a priori declarations about what things might be 
included in, or excluded from, our aesthetically-oriented conversations.  To analyse a text for 
its representations of particular dimensions of socio-cultural identity and to treat it as an 
aesthetic object are different activities, but not necessarily mutually exclusive ones.  One is 510 
on firmer ground when one is being prescriptive and exclusionary in one’s aims, one’s 
principal reasons for writing; it is often much harder to justify the exclusion of the 
consideration of particular issues or topics in pursuit of those aims, even if some of those 
issues and topic might irksomely lead one back (at least part of the way) to places one was 
seeking, in the framing of one’s aims, to get (and stay) away from. As Cardwell notes, 
‘“aesthetic vision” [...] entails a heightened alertness to the formal, sensory and “design” 
qualities of the artwork under scrutiny’ (2013: 32), but as she also notes, this does not entail 
‘the exclusion of concerns “beyond” the formal qualities of the text’ (ibid: 36). One 
extremely valuable and vital thread in the discussion of television aesthetics and evaluation is 
that accounts and activity in this area must be informed by (and seek to do justice to) the 520 
diversity (in the intentions of the programmes’ makers, and the ‘contracts’ implicitly struck 
with viewers) of television output. The specific instance of this general point that it seems to 
me to be most pressing to acknowledge at this juncture is that the overwhelming majority of 
television represents the social world.  Pure form, such as one finds in non-representational 
art and sometimes in music, if it features at all in television programmes, will almost always 
be a minority component.  Attending aesthetically to the formal, sensory and design qualities 
of an artwork will in large part entail attending to how representational content has been 
given significant form.  This is not a bad description of the creative work of the television 
artist, and I would feel confident in assuming that most key creative television personnel do 
not view the representational content as an unfortunate imposition upon or corruption of their 530 
pursuit of pure form, but an irreducible component of what they are trying to achieve, and of 
what makes their work valuable.  If aesthetic analysis also involves an attempt to do justice to 
the specific ways in which an artwork has been constructed and is trying to ‘speak’ to us, then 
again, we find ourselves in the realm of the social.  When this happens, judgments that bear 
upon the social world will rarely be absent for long.  When Jacobs and Peacock describe the 
business with the coffee pot as eloquent, they are highlighting a moment of experience, 
which, as their earlier reference to servitude indicates, is at least in part a reference to social 
experience.  The excellent, deep traditions of, say, philosophical aesthetics and filmic mise-
en-scène criticism will furnish us with specialist vocabularies and ways of seeing that will 
help us to apprehend and discuss matters of aesthetic conventions, artistic intention, irony, the 540 
relation of parts to wholes, and matters to do with the unassumingly elegant and significant 
staging of action for the camera – vocabularies and ways of seeing that other traditions are 
less well-equipped to provide.  However, if we also want to talk about the achievements 
represented by Mad Men’s historical imagination (as Jacobs and Peacock do), or the 
satisfying complexity of The Wire’s depiction of the social determinants of individual and 
institutional behaviour (as Mittell does), both of which are at least in part aesthetic 
achievements, then the vocabularies and ways of seeing of, for starters, history and sociology, 
respectively, should not be eschewed as lifeless frameworks that would constitute impositions 
on these artworks, and come between us and our aesthetic experiences, but as tools that might 
fine tune our ability to do justice to the aesthetic achievements of these works. 550 
Some on the television aesthetics ‘side’ of the debate may feel that I have ceded too 
much ground to ‘the social’ here, and I acknowledge that it is extremely difficult to strike the 
right balance and tone when discussing these matters. A few disclaimers seem to be in order, 
then. First, and once again: the crucial matter seems to me to be the points at and the ways in 
which ‘the social’ (re-)enters aesthetically-oriented accounts. A television drama might be 
fully in line with a particular viewer’s convictions regarding a particular political topic, but 
that would not necessarily lead to a positive aesthetic evaluation. On the other hand, a drama 
which endorsed the opposite of a viewer’s deeply-held convictions would, whatever artistry 
that viewer conceded, be tainted aesthetically for that viewer. In the first hypothetical 
instance, the perceived deficiency and demerit might be triteness; in the second, it would be 560 
dishonesty. Both evaluations carry a charge that is simultaneously aesthetic, social, and 
moral. I would also want to define ‘the social’ as an area of experience that exceeds matters 
of power and (identity) politics. Robin Nelson, as we have seen briefly above, seeks to 
theorise abstract principles underpinning our shared humanity and common being-in-the-
world, and to use this as a basis for evaluation. The other key example I would invoke is 
Paddy Scannell, who focuses less upon abstract principles than upon the ways in which 
television (and broadcasting more generally) is imbricated with areas of human life that 
precede or otherwise sidestep the political. Scannell is not concerned with aesthetics or 
evaluation, but his work can be used to inform these areas of concern. I am willing to 
concede the possibility that there may be areas of concern within television aesthetics where 570 
‘the social’ can be held at bay more fully. Cardwell and Nanicelli’s pursuit of ontological and 
metacritical questions derived from the philosophy of aesthetics seem to me the best 
candidates for this category. However, I am convinced that as soon as a writer declares, 
implicitly or explicitly, ‘this television text has value, an irreducible part of which is aesthetic 
value, because…’, then a consideration of matters that fall within the realm of ‘the social’ is 
unavoidable if a full case for that value is going to be presented. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have tried to unpick what I see as some pressing problems on both sides of 580 
the ‘media and cultural studies versus television aesthetics’ debate. In this debate, the 
tremendous intellectual work of Pierre Bourdieu has unfortunately been reduced to the status 
of a roadblock.  He is invoked, but often not meaningfully engaged with by those who want 
to argue that ‘art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously and deliberately or 
not, to fulfil a social function of legitimating social differences’ (Bourdieu 1984: xxx).  He is 
usually simply ignored by television aestheticians.  However, if we think Bourdieu through, 
and try to think with him, the results are rewarding, and sometimes surprising.  Bourdieu does 
not subscribe to the Manichean view of social power and space that his position is often and 
unfortunately reduced to in thumbnail sketches of his research on culture and taste.  Nor is he 
easily categorisable as a populist; Distinction includes some stern asides against populism, 590 
including Bourdieu’s description of it as ‘inverted ethnocentrism’ (1984: 375).  In 
Distinction, Bourdieu convincingly displaces the Kantian aesthetic from its position as the 
universal aesthetic, but his account is not committed to exposing its arbitrariness or its 
oppressiveness.  Rather, Bourdieu’s thorough research and sociological methods reveal the 
deep logic of the habitus of the class fraction most fully aligned with the Kantian aesthetic of 
ease and asceticism: the dominated fraction of the dominant class.  As this label indicates, 
Bourdieu takes care to identify this aesthetic as residing in the social space not only ‘above’ 
the dominated class (which means it may indeed operate as a source of repression, or 
aspiration) but also below the dominant fraction of the dominant class (which means that it is 
a reaction to subordination, or restriction); and as Bourdieu also notes, this in-between 600 
position can help to explain the sympathy of those possessing this habitus for aesthetic 
revolutions and negative portrayals of the social world.  And although it does not appear to be 
one of Bourdieu’s direct aims, one can also glean from Distinction, thanks to his gifts of 
observation and his frequent deployment of novelistic passages of sympathy-in-detachment, a 
sense of what is particularly (not universally, not exclusively) valuable about the values of 
this particular class fraction and world view.  These observations may not overturn the 
objections that have been raised against television scholars (many of whom, and perhaps an 
increasing number given certain trends in employment status within higher education, surely 
qualify as members of the dominated fraction of the dominant class) bringing their native 
habitus to bear upon television programmes, but I hope that they do at least make such 610 
activity begin to appear less pernicious and more defensible. 
My essential point ‘against’ the attempted bracketing of ‘media and cultural studies’ by 
some television aestheticians is that the status of most television programming as some form 
of representation of the social world means that one cannot usefully remain in the realm of 
pure form for very long.  In Film Studies, the scholar who surely represents the most 
monumental and sustained effort to afford the social and the cultural only a limited and 
prescribed place in his method is David Bordwell.  However we evaluate the success of the 
model offered by Bordwell, it seems clear that it is not currently the prevailing direction of 
travel in television aesthetics.  In the introduction to Television Aesthetics and Style, Jacobs 
and Peacock correctly identify Jeremy Butler as the closest equivalent to Bordwell’s 620 
approach within television studies (2013: 10), only to quickly proceed to align themselves 
more closely with an approach that blends attention to ‘style, interpretation and evaluation’ 
(ibid).  However, as soon as one enters such terrain, and as soon as one finds oneself, in the 
course of one’s stylistic and evaluative interpretation, having to make, as part of that activity, 
claims about a programme’s historical or cultural imagination, and its achievements in those 
realms, it becomes much more difficult to defend an exclusion of non-aesthetically-oriented 
methods. 
It is ill-founded to suggest that claims for value cannot or should not be made because 
they fall short of the universal.  Contingent value is still value.  And although it may be hard 
to entirely uncouple evaluation and social distinctions, oppression is not the sole outcome of 630 
the former activity.  It also seems difficult to reasonably maintain that television aesthetics 
can flourish without making the insights and traditions of media and cultural studies one part 
of its intellectual armoury.  A method blending aesthetic and cultural orientations – for which 
we have numerous valuable precedents in the work of, for example, Richard Hoggart, Robin 
Wood, and especially, Raymond Williams – whilst it can hardly be recommended as the only 
game in town, ought not to be seen as outmoded.  Audience research, fan studies, popular 
aesthetics, explorations of political economy and questions of technology are all crucial parts 
of contemporary television studies.  There remains room, however, for television scholars to 
engage closely with the television programmes that they deem valuable, and to attempt to 
explicate this value (which will be both aesthetic and cultural) and to cultivate a sense of it in 640 
others.  This is one of the roles that I see television aesthetics as being particularly well-
placed to fulfil. 
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